The Spring 2016 Philosophy Colloquium Series presents our own Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. The title of their talk is "Moral Penomenology and Reasons-Responsiveness." (Abstract below.)
Friday, Apr 22, 2016, 3-5pm, Maloney Seminar Room, Social Sciences 224 (1145 E South Campus Drive 85721).
Our talk is an overview of some of the themes from our book in progress, Illuminating Reasons: An Essay on Moral Phenomenology in which we address a range of questions at the intersection of moral philosophy and moral psychology, largely by appeal to phenomenological evidence. We begin the talk by explaining how we understand moral phenomenology – its subject matter and methodology. We then turn to two particular issues of current interest, namely, the nature of
moral judgment and the so-called paradox of supererogation. First, we articulate a view about the psychology of moral judgment that we call “chromatic rationalism,” which we position as a largely overlooked competitor to standard forms of psychological rationalism as well as to forms of psychological intuitionism of the sort recently defended by Jonathan Haidt. An important part of our defense of chromatic rationalism appeals to phenomenological evidence. Second, we address the “paradox” of supererogation, arguing that attention to the phenomenology of experiences of ordinary instances of supererogation help reveal a largely unnoticed role for reasons to play in one’s experience, namely a non-requiring, favoring role. We argue that recognizing this particular kind of role for reasons to play serves to resolve the alleged paradox.