The Spring 2016 Philosophy Colloquium Series presents Alan Hajek, Australian National University. The title of his talk is "Begging To Differ With Similarity Accounts Of Counterfactuals." (Abstract below.)
Wednesday, Apr 6, 2016, 10am-noon, Maloney Seminar Room, Social Sciences 224 (1145 E South Campus Drive 85721).
Widespread agreement among philosophers on a given topic is rare. However, it is enjoyed by the Stalnaker/Lewis similarity accounts of counterfactuals. Roughly, they say that the counterfactual
if p were the case, q would be the case
is true if and only if
at the nearest p-worlds, q is true.
I disagree with these accounts, for many reasons. A recurring problem is that they render true various implausibly specific counterfactuals. I suggest an alternative proposal for the right-hand side:at the sufficiently near p-worlds, q is true.