The Spring 2016 Philosophy Colloquium Series presents Guido Melchior, University of Graz. The title of his talk is "Knowing And Checking." (Abstract below.)
Friday, Apr 8, 2016, 3-5pm, Maloney Seminar Room, Social Sciences 224 (1145 E South Campus Drive 85721).
‘Checking’ is a much neglected concept in contemporary epistemology, although it is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic goals and actions. In this paper, I present an account of checking. I will argue that successfully checking has to be explained in terms that capture the modal features of the involved checking method. Importantly, successfully checking whether p is true requires using a method that is sensitive with respect to p. Thus, sensitivity is necessary for checking, although it is plausibly not necessary for knowing. Hence, sensitivity marks a crucial distinction between knowing and checking. In the first part, I analyze the internalistic and externalistic components of checking which include the intentions of the checking subject plus the modal features of the used checking method. In the second part, I use the distinction between knowing and checking in terms of sensitivity to explain puzzles about knowledge, especially puzzles centering on knowledge closure like the skeptical puzzle.