A Subjectivist Theory of Reparations
When
Where
Title: A Subjectivist Theory of Reparations
Abstract: Some believe that certain presently existing people have claim rights to reparations on the basis of injustices committed in the distant past. The difficulty in developing a widely appealing theory of reparative justice is due in large part to key differences between ordinary cases of compensation, where the agent and claim-bearer exist concurrently, and cases of compensation for past injustices. In the latter instance, those directly impacted by the historical atrocity in question no longer exist, so it is not immediately clear on what basis a presently existing person might have a claim to reparations. This is a common point of focus in the reparations literature. In this paper, I focus on a different point of concern: Even if presently existing people can have features which ground claim rights to compensatory benefits on the basis of past injustice, there is often uncertainty about whether a given person possesses those features. This epistemic worry plagues two dominant views in the reparations literature. According to inheritance views, descendants of victims inherit claim rights to reparations. It is difficult, however, to determine whether a given person has the relevant ancestral history. According to harm views, presently existing people harmed as a result of historical injustice are owed compensation for that harm. But, similarly to the worry faced by inheritance views, it is difficult to determine whether the relevant causal chain obtains. I argue that the best way out of the epistemic objection for proponents of both inheritance views and harm views is to defend a subjectivist theory of reparations, according to which it is not facts about claimholders which ground obligations of reparative justice but rather the information about claimholders possessed by the agent. More specifically, the strength of a claim right to reparations is discounted according to the unlikelihood that the reparative claimholder possesses the relevant features from the perspective of the decision-maker (for inheritance views, that is the relevant ancestral history; for harm views, that is standing in the relevant causal relationship). The underlying justification for a subjectivist theory of reparations is not limited to the fact that it helps us to escape the aforementioned epistemic difficulty. In addition, a subjectivist account is consistent with our intuitions in ordinary instances of compensation, and it is upheld by a moral commitment to acting out of reasonable concern for each individual person.
As usual, we'll meet in the Maloney Seminar Room, Social Science Building 224, 3-5p. Watch the lecture by Zoom if you cannot attend in person.