The Fall 2015 Philosophy Colloquium Series presents Vladimir Krstic, University of Auckland. The title of his talk is "Must A Liar Say What He Does Not Believe? An Essay On Assertions, Lies, And Knowledge." (Abstract below.)
Friday, Sep 18, 2015, 3-5pm, Maloney Seminar Room, Social Sciences 224 (1145 E South Campus Drive 85721).
Theorists disagree on what a person should do in order to tell a lie, thus the proposed sets of necessary and sufficient conditions of lying widely differ. However, there is one intuition that all accounts seem to share. When one thinks about lying, one imagines a person who says something she believes to be false. I think that this intutition is false and that Moore's advice--it is absurd to asser that p while not believing that p--does not apply to a possibly sizable class of cases. In this paper, I consider some cases that are either offered in the literature as the cases in which the asserter sincerely asserts something he does not believe, or that might be interpreted as such. Then, I show that these cases involve four significant restrictions that make them somewhat unconvincing. Finally, I present my case, in which the person sincerely asserts what she believes to be false, and then draw relevant accounts of asserting and lying. On my account, asserting is understood in terms of the speaker's intentional warranting what he recognizes as true. This cognitive state need not be followed by the relevant belief.