12/6 Colloquium - Derk Pereboom

Title: Styles of Blame and Social Equilibria

Abstract: Does blaming in relationships involve holding attitudes that impair or reflect impairment of those relationships, as Tim Scanlon (2009) contends? In “Blame Italian Style,” Susan Wolf’s (2011) response to Scanlon’s account, she denies this, specifically with respect to angry blame. Wolf argues that angry blame in personal relationships need not involve holding attitudes that reflect impairment of those relationships, and that angry blame for ordinary wrongdoing is in general better for personal relationships than Scanlon’s alternative, which foregrounds withdrawal. A general type of practice of holding morally responsible that prominently features angry blame, of which blame Italian style is a paradigm case, is held by many to be normative for human beings universally. My objective is to argue against such a universalism, but not by aiming to show that there are better options than blame Italian style. I propose instead that among differing versions of the practice there are multiple equals, arguably including both blame Italian style and Scanlon’s alternative.

The account I develop affirms a proposal by Manuel Vargas (2013, 246-47; cf. Sam Reis-Dennis 2019, 2021) on which expression of the reactive attitudes is justified by its role in social ecology, and specifically through maintaining an equilibrium. I characterize such an equilibrium as a state of a practice of holding morally responsible that subserves the well-being of a population in its environment and commands general acceptance and stability over an extended period. Equilibria need not be, and perhaps never are, morally optimal, and are subject to justified revision. While blame Italian style may realize one such equilibrium, there are other equilibria, including those realized by less volatile styles of blame. Such differing equilibria result from angry blame’s having both benefits and costs. A practice of holding responsible that involves greater limitations on angry blame can reduce its costs, but then the benefits of angry blame also stand to be reduced. This results in multiple equilibria with a similar or at least indistinguishable balances of costs and benefits.

I hope you can join us. And for those unable to join in person, I hope the seminar room tech permits a functional Zoom option this time around.