Competence with Testimony - Sensitivity to Information Possessed
When
Title: Competence with Testimony - Sensitivity to Information Possessed
Abstract: Evidentialists with regard to the epistemology of testimony hold that the epistemically justified formation of belief on the basis of testimony requires one to have and be responsive to on balanced evidence for thinking the testimony is reliable. Often they do not give an account of how this makes for a tractable epistemic practice. Anti-evidentialists hold that one has a default entitlement to form beliefs on the basis of testimony—and entitlement that does not itself turn on positive reasons for thinking that the testimony one receives is reliable. I argue for an intermediate position in which there is commonly an entitlement of a sort—an evidentially embedded entitlement. At the same time, I seek an understanding of how this makes for a realistic and workable responsiveness to what evidence agents very commonly possess regarding the reliability of testimony. I consider a range of cases, finding continuities, and situate the relevant epistemic competence in Henderson and Horgan’s iceberg epistemology.