When
Title: Objectivism about Context-sensitivity and Modal Domain Restriction
Abstract: In linguistics, the dominant semantics for modal expressions (expressions such as “must”, “might”, and “should”) is contextualist. A contextualist semantics holds that the meaning of a sentence varies with its context of use. But how are these meanings resolved as a function of context? Absent an answer, testing the dominant semantics against the data is difficult. Here I defend an Objectivist account of how context-sensitivity is resolved against its two main rivals, Conventionalism and Gricean Intentionalism. Using that account, I show how the interpretation of otherwise puzzling, but ordinary uses of modal sentences, one epistemic and one deontic, are resolved.
Time permitting, we will consider how the resulting account might explain some puzzling
patterns concerning the strength and indirectness of the epistemic “must”.
As usual, we'll meet in the Maloney Seminar Room, Social Science Building 224, 3-5p. Those unable to attend in person can spectate virtually via this Zoom link.