When
Title: Making Duties Count
Abstract: Many of us believe that when one can save some, but not all, people from each suffering the same serious harm, one should often save the greater number. Perhaps the most tempting way to explain this obligation involves interpersonal aggregation: one should save the greater number because, in doing so, one can avert more total harm. But in many cases, interpersonal aggregation seems objectionable. In this paper I offer a novel explanation of why we should sometimes save the greater number. I argue that the burdens connected with our duties of rescue can intrapersonally aggregate, that is, they can add up within the life of a single duty-bearer. In some cases where we face a choice between rescuing one person from harm, or rescuing some larger group of people who each face a serious harm, we can justify failing to rescue the one person by pointing out the harm that person will suffer is no greater that the total burdens he would be duty-bound to suffer to rescue each member of the larger group. My main aim is thus to show that we can sometimes justify saving the greater number via reasoning that involves no interpersonal aggregation. I also show that my proposed approach avoids the main problems that confront most versions of so-called limited aggregation.
As usual, we'll meet in the Maloney Seminar Room, Social Science Building 224, 3-5p. Those unable to attend in person can spectate virtually via this Zoom link.