Naming, Meaning, and Understanding in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
When
Title of Talk:
Naming, Meaning, and Understanding in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
Abstract:
I start with the first section of the Investigations, where Wittgenstein rejects a conception of language based on the idea that meaning is essentially naming and that the meanings of words and phrases are the objects and properties they name. According to this conception, language arises because we are aware of things in the world and want to communicate about them. Although this seems obvious, Wittgenstein challenges a corollary. If you want to learn a language, you must first identify which things the various words stand for. His most interesting comments center on numerals as names for natural numbers. Although his discussion is illuminating, getting to the bottom of things requires more recent ideas that are in tension with his. Related points will be made about his general discussion of naming and the role of names of all sorts (and referring) in our understanding of language. In addition to section 1 of the Investigations, special attention will be paid to sections 32, 39, 40 and 79, including how they bear on theses about meaning and reference in more recent decades. If there is time, I will very briefly summarize the general conception of philosophy articulated in sections 81-133.
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