Philosophy Colloquium: Guido Melchior
Rationally Irresolvable Disagreement
The Spring 2022 Philosophy Colloquium Series presents Guido Melchior (University of Graz).
The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement. I will argue that this approach has significant advantages over existing theories of deep disagreement, which focus on hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles.