Dilemmas in epistemology and decision theory (in collaboration with Matthew McGrath)
When
3 to 5 p.m., April 3, 2020
The Spring 2020 Philosophy Colloquium Series presents Juan Comesaña (University of Arizona).
This colloquium talk will be hosted on Zoom by Jonathan Weinberg. Please contact Dr. Weinberg if you would like to attend the talk.
Abstract:
Some evidentialists think that only evidence provides reasons for belief. Some pragmatists think that, on the contrary, there can be practical reasons for belief. For instance, pragmatists think that you may have practical reasons for believing that you will not contract COVID-19 (believing this will lower your stress level, say) even if all the evidence indicates that you will. Evidentialists respond that whereas you have a practical reason to bring it about that you believe, you do not have a practical reason to believe. But now the evidentialist seems to be countenancing the existence of a kind of dilemma: you ought to bring it about that you do something while you also ought not to do that thing. Insofar as we do not think that these kinds of dilemmas are not possible, the evidentialist position is untenable.
There are many ways for the evidentialist to reply, including many different ways of arguing that the dilemmas in question are not problematic. We argue that everyone is committed to exactly the same kind of dilemmas arising in the practical realm. We start by showing that two-boxers regarding Newcomb’s problem are committed to such dilemmas. The natural answer here is to argue that one-boxing is the right answer to Newcomb’s problem. It isn’t. But: even one-boxers are committed to the existence of that kind of dilemmas. Therefore, insofar as we should all learn to live with dilemmas of that sort in the practical realm, the evidentialist position is vindicated.
Contacts
Jonathan Weinberg