When
Title: Justified False Moral Beliefs and the Problem of Over-exoneration
Abstract: Suppose that there are false justified moral beliefs. More specifically, suppose we sometimes have false justified beliefs about our own moral obligations. This natural assumption generates a puzzle: it seems to imply that agents who act on such beliefs are not culpable for their actions—a result I call over-exoneration. We can accept that there are false justified moral beliefs without over-exonerating if we reject the JJ Principle: the claim that if one is justified in believing that one ought to φ then one is justified in φ-ing. I argue that the key to understanding when and why the principle fails lies in a distinction between opaque and transparent moral evidence.
As usual, we'll meet in the Maloney Seminar Room. Those unable to attend in person can spectate virtually via this Zoom link. The talk will be a bit shorter than a typical colloquium talk (90 minutes total as opposed to the usual 120). Those interested in joining Sarah at Time Market after the talk should email David Clark. All attendees welcome.