When
This Wednesday, October 29, the University of Arizona Department of Philosophy Colloquium Series presents Tez Clark (New York University).
The colloquium will be held from 3 pm to 5 pm in the Chris Maloney Seminar Room (Social Science 224). You can also join via Zoom at this link
Title: "Towards a Relational View of Incoherence"
Abstract: Some combinations of attitudes are incoherent—they don't "fit" together in some way. Examples include not only logically inconsistent beliefs (believing p and believing not-p), but also combinations such as: believing p and believing that one's evidence doesn't support p, intending to Φ and failing to intend the believed necessary means to Φ, and so on. Existing accounts of incoherence largely assume that incoherence is in some sense intrinsic to certain combinations, such that whether a combination of attitudes is incoherent doesn't depend on the context (including the broader psychology of an agent with those attitudes). I argue that these accounts are mistaken. Instead, I suggest an alternative family of views, based on the idea that incoherent attitudes are distinguished by being unintelligible, and sketch some choice points for developing such a view.
We look forward to seeing you there!